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BALKAN AND EUROPEAN? PLACE IDENTIFICATIONS OF YOUNG 
PEOPLE  IN CROATIA 
  
 
The article analyses how young people in Croatia conceptualise their identities in 
terms of “place”. It is based on focus group discussions conducted with 68 secondary 
school students in three localities in Croatia: Rijeka, Zagreb and Zadar. Concepts 
guiding the analysis include place identifications, the civic and cultural components of 
identity, and intersectionality. We found that students display a strong identification 
with the region they are from through a discourse of stereotypes along the coastal-
inland, rural-urban and north-south distinctions. Their narratives of both national 
cultural identities and of liminal European-Balkan identities are equally strong 
providing interesting examples of inclusion and othering. The young people showed a 
sense of aspiring to be European, of feeling almost European, of being not-quite-yet 
European, of being “Balkan”. There was a common sense of the Balkan-European 
divide being a line that stood very slightly to the north-west of wherever the students 
happened to be: there was Europe, generally beckoning – but they were on a threshold 
and still leaning towards the Balkan side, described as impolite, quarrelsome, under-
developed and littered.  
 
Key words: place identification, civic and cultural identities, youth, Croatia, Balkans, 
Europe 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996) have written on people’s expressed identification 
with a particular place, using the concept “place identifications” as a type of social 
identification which captures membership of a group of people who are defined by 
their location. People’s relationships to different places have been the focus of several 
studies in Croatia, including the one reported in this article. For instance, Sekulić and 
Šporer (2008) have analysed the intensity of attachment adults in Croatia have to their 
place of living, specific county and region, Croatia as a whole, a particular region in 
Europe as well as Europe more generally. Their results showed that people generally 
feel the strongest attachment to the national level, followed by those expressing a very 
close attachment to their more immediate place of living, while the weakest 
attachment was felt to Europe and its particular regions. The authors discussed 
positive correlations between attachments to Europe and Croatia, suggesting that the 
attachment to Europe does not replace or exclude national identification, but can be 
seen as part of a process of broadening the identity space. Longitudinal research on 
youth identities in Croatia has shown that national identification has become stronger 
(Baranović, 2002; Radin, 2005), although the intensity of this identification varies 
with respect to young people’s family background, residence status (urban vs. non-
                                                 
1 This paper is part of a larger project investigating how young people conceptualise their identities in a 
string of countries that have either joined the European Union in the 2004-2008 expansion, or are 
currently candidate countries to become members - some 15 countries, from Iceland and Estonia in the 
north, through east and central Europe, the Balkans, to Turkey and Cyprus in the south (Ross, 2015). 
Croatia is the only country to actually move from candidate status to full membership during the course 
of this study. 
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urban) and religiosity. In general, stronger national identification prevails among 
religious youth, those from rural or less developed areas, who come from lower socio-
economic family backgrounds, and especially those whose parents have lower levels 
of education. Importantly, attitudes that reflect openness to other nations have 
remained relatively stable suggesting that strong national identification can coexist 
with an acceptance of cosmopolitan values. In line with this, data from 2012 (Ilišin et 
al., 2013) showed that a majority of young people in Croatia supported Croatia’s 
accession to the EU and that positive expectations from the EU prevailed over 
negative ones. This finding is consistent with research on the multiple identities of 18-
24 year olds in six European countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Slovakia, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom) which shows a positive correlation between 
European identity and national or other place identifications (region of residence, 
birthplace) (Boehnke and Fuss, 2008). However, along with the aforementioned 
“optimistic” view of joining the EU, young people in Croatia have also expressed 
significant euro-scepticism, particularly in relation to their future socio-economic 
status in the wider EU region. According to Baranović (2002: 138), young people in 
Croatia expressed an image of Europe that “is ambiguous and varies from synonym 
for progressive and civilized to a source of danger and threat”. The research presented 
in this article on how young people in Croatia identify with “places” at different levels 
of abstraction has some resonance with this conclusion, but was conducted on the 
cusp of Croatia’s accession to the EU. 
 
The presented analysis expands existing research on youth in Croatia in various ways. 
While past research was mainly quantitative in nature, our study analyses qualitative 
data gathered from focus groups discussions in order to addresses the under 
researched issue of multiple identities of young people in Croatia, or more 
specifically, the European, national and other place identifications of secondary 
school students from various Croatian regions. Consistent with its topic of interest, the 
study combines various theoretical concepts that capture the broad area of identity 
issues, and which have not been used together in previous research on young people 
in Croatia. 
 
2. Guiding concepts 
 
Along with place identifications, we use the distinction between civic and cultural 
components of identity as well as intersectionality to capture how the young people 
we talked to in Croatia relate to different “places”: their immediate locality, regional 
affiliation, Croatia, the Balkans and Europe. The term “Balkan” is both a geographical 
and a cultural construction (Wolff, 1994; Todorova, 2009), and we use it here loosely 
to refer to the expressions used by young people in the study. The Balkans have for 
many years had a particular aura among Western Europeans. Maria Todorova (2009) 
has written of the manner in which the Balkans have been imagined: the development 
over several centuries of an insidious intellectual concept of an identity that denied the 
region’s European character. Western Europe, she claims, has “expropriated the 
category of Europe, with concrete political and moral consequences” (Todorova, 
2009: 202).  Todorova draws on post-colonial theory to examine how the region has 
been positioned in a variety of discourses: in particular, she analyses the 
disparagement of the Balkan identity in a form of reductionism that has allowed “the 
Balkans” to be peopled by “inhabitants [who] do not care to conform to the standards 
of behaviour devised as normative by and for the civilised world” (Todorova, 2009: 
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3). The concept of the Balkans has been used in a derogatory manner to describe 
fragmentary and incoherent mini-states, impetuous and impulsive nationalism, 
powder-keg politics. Balkan has come to mean not-properly-European. 
The concept of Europe is in many ways ambiguous and “terminologically 
confusing” (Connor, 1978: 386). In much the same way that Renan wrote of a people 
having “many things in common, but … also forgotten much together” (1994 [1882]: 
17), it has been observed that post-1945 Europe “was able to rebuild itself politically 
and economically only by forgetting the past, but it was able to define itself morally 
and culturally only by remembering it” (Menard, 2005). As Judt puts it in Post War: 
“silence over Europe’s recent past was the necessary condition for the construction of 
a European future” (Judt, 2005: 10). European identity has become part of the 
palimpsest identity described by Bauman, one “which fits a world in which the art of 
forgetting is an asset” (1997: 25).  
The distinction between different kinds of European identity has been 
systematically analysed by Michael Bruter (2005, also 2003a, b, 2008 a, b, 2009), 
who derives two components of identity within political communities: “A cultural 
perspective would analyse political identities as the sense of belonging an individual 
citizen feels towards a particular political group. This group can be perceived by him 
[sic] to be defined by a certain culture, social similarities, values, religion, ethics or 
even ethnicity… A civic perspective would see… the identification of citizens with a 
civic structure, such as the State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, 
and rules that preside over the political life of the community” (Bruter, 2005: 12). 
Bruter contends that these two components exist in parallel in citizens’ minds, and 
need to be differentiated when possible: the individual may have stronger civic or 
cultural elements to their (European) identity, with differences between individuals, 
countries, and over periods of time. Using a questionnaire with UK, French and Dutch 
respondents, he offers empirical support for the existence of “a civic component… 
[that] makes people identify with the European Union as a significant ‘superstate’ 
identity, and … a cultural component that makes people identify with Europe in 
general as an area of shared civilisation and heritage” (2005: 114). His respondents 
gave greater salience to their European civic identity, speculating that a common 
European heritage might be too much of abstraction.  
The differentiation of cultural and civic references is core to the analysis of 
young people which follows, both of their identification with Europe and their 
identification with their country. It will become evident that the two competing poles 
of the cultural and the civic jockey for position contingently and temporally in the 
ways that young people construct and use their identities (Waldron, 2000; Stevick and 
Levinson, 2007; Ichilov, 2005). This cultural-civic distinction also helps in 
understanding the ways in which otherness is constructed in the feeling of an identity. 
Boundaries and markers may be constructed in an exclusive way, or may be 
permeable (Schöpflin, 2001; Schlenker, 2007).  
Finally, we have found it useful to draw on theories of intersectionality to 
examine how young people describe their place identifications. McCall (2005: 1171) 
defines intersectionality as “the relationship among multiple dimensions and 
modalities of social relations and subject formations”, encompassing “perspectives 
that completely reject the separability of analytic and identity categories” (2005: 
1171, footnote 1). The traditional axes of identity used in intersectionality are gender 
and race (Crenshaw, 1991), to which social class, ethnicity and ability have often been 
added. Identity formation is not based on each of these factors being independent of 
the other: they inter-relate and intersect to create multiple forms of oppression and 
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discrimination (Ritzer, 2007). The literature on intersectionality has informed our 
study by directing our attention to multiple, intersecting levels of place 
identifications: we assumed that they are structured in part by dimensions of 
nationality and regionalism, as well as Europeanisation and were curious to find out 
about other levels. In addition, we expected that these identities would be shaped by 
each other to create a tangled and complex nexus of more or less exclusive group 
identities.  
 
3. The research study 
 
The following questions informed our research study: Which “places” do young 
people in Croatia identify with? Do they acknowledge a multiplicity of place 
identifications, or are their narratives singular and essentialist in terms of place? Do 
their place identifications require the construction of “the Other”, an alien identity 
held in juxtaposition to their own identity? If so, where are the borders to “otherness”? 
Do young people in Croatia identify with the cultural and civic aspects of Europe? Do 
they use the same components in their identification with their country?  
As noted earlier, the data on Croatia analysed here was gathered as part of a 
larger study by the first author, of all the countries that joined the European Union 
since 2004 and the candidate states in accession negotiations (which later status 
included Croatia at the time of the study) (Ross, 2015).  This study examined the ways 
in which young people socially construct identities than may encompass the local, 
national, regional, European or global, or some or all of these, in varying degrees, and 
examines their discourse of managing multiple identities with these various political 
‘places’.   Kristeva (2000) has asked how the European Union can be “meaningful and 
not just useful” (2000: 118).  Part of this study was to examine the various meanings 
that were attached by these young people to their country of residence and to Europe, 
and to any possible intermediary identities such as the Balkans: the larger study also 
included Slovenia, Macedonia and Bulgaria.  The discourses by which the young 
people both contest and reflect on these political identities can contribute to 
understanding the processes of Europeanization and globalisation, and the relationship 
between them (Delanty and Rumford 2005:6; Castells 2000: 348). 
Since this study is of how young peoples’ identities are socially constructed in 
relation to place, and because social constructions are relational and created through 
interaction in a social context, we have used focus group discussions as a principal 
data source (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). The centrality of shared social 
constructions makes focus group discussions an appropriate research tool which 
enables multiple voices to be “heard”, while reducing the necessity for potentially 
distorting interventions by the researcher whose role is more of a mediator. Therefore 
the choice of focus groups as the study’s main method was guided by the expectation 
that young peoples’ own constructions would more spontaneously emerge from the 
discussions and interchange with their peers, although we are aware of the limitations 
of focus group discussions including the risk of participants not feeling comfortable 
with each other which can shape their willingness to speak or what they say 
(Smithson, 2000). The focus groups took place in Croatia in October 2012, some nine 
months prior to Croatia’s EU entry, in three urban locations. These gave a wide 
geographical spread, but we did not visit any rural schools.    
 
Table 1. Focus groups: locations, numbers 
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Locations 
number 
of 
schools 
number 
of 
groups 
female 
students 
male 
students 
total 
students 
dates of focus 
groups 
Zadar 2 4 11 11 22 16 Oct 2012 
Rijeka 2 3 10 8 18 17 Oct 2012 
Zagreb 2 4 14 14 28 18 Oct 2012 
 6 11 35 33 68  
 
In each location two schools (a grammar school and vocational school) with different 
social mixes were selected, and in each location there were three or four groups of 12 
-13 year olds and 15 - 16 year olds. The students who attended the focus groups were 
selected by the teacher who was the research team’s main school contact. Permission 
was sought from the young people and, for those under 16, from their parents. We 
tried as far as possible to include an equal number of males and females. We were not 
concerned with legal nationality or status, but young people whose home is now in the 
country. We tried, by demeanour, expression and question, to make it clear that we 
respected what they have to say. The focus groups were led by the same researcher 
with the support of a co-moderator who was a different person in each of the three 
locations.  
The opening question challenged them: “How would you describe yourself?  
What would you say your identity is?” Other issues followed: Do you ever describe 
yourselves in other ways? Does being in Europe affect the way you think about your 
identity, and your future? What is particular or different about Europeans? 
Discussions were transcribed and examined and systematically analyzed 
against a country-specific index of themes built partly on the cultural-civic 
perspectives of Bruter’s study (2005), partly on Todorova’s analysis of the concept of 
the Balkans, partly on country-specific literature (Sekulić and Šporer, 2008; 
Baranović 2002), and partly on the groups’ specific narratives (Rabiee, 2004). The 
themes for the Croatian analysis thus reflected both the general themes that were 
common to all the countries in the wider study (fn1, above), and specific aspects of 
both the Croatian and Balkan culture. All names used are pseudonyms. The project 
would not have been possible without help from many people, to whom we are 
indebted.2  
 
4. Findings 
4.1. Regional and national identifications: prejudice and divisions 
 
A vital part of social identity constructions is the “process of differentiation and 
demarcation by which the line is drawn between “us” and “them”’ (Lister, 2004, in 
Jensen, 2011: 65). These differentiations, which determine social identities as the 
same or different from the “Other”, are often paralleled by stereotypical reasoning 
with regard to in-group and out-group relations. Stereotypes express beliefs about the 
characteristics and behaviours of certain groups (Hilton and Von Hippel, 1996). In 
doing so, they affirm group identity by ascribing homogeneous traits to members of 
the in-group as well as to members of other groups regardless of the actual variation 
among members of the concerned groups (Bar-Tal, 1997; Koren, 2013). Divisions 
accompanied by stereotyping and prejudice both within Croatia (north-south-other, 
                                                 
2 Branislava Baranović, Iva Buchberger, Bojana Ćulum, Ivana Jugović, Iva Košutić, Vesna Kovač, the 
heads/principals of the schools and the students. 
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inland-coastal, rural-urban) and in reference to neighbouring countries ran through the 
focus groups. In Zadar, Josip P (♂ 15½)3 said: “People in the south have more 
temperament, but they are also more lazy than the ones in the north. There’s a big 
difference from the rest of Croatia. There are also Istrians in Istria – who are very 
different from the ones in the north and the south.” A group in another school in 
Rijeka saw people from Primorje (the northern coastal region) as different from 
“other” Croatians. Zrinka B (♀ 14¼) said “when it comes to arriving on time, or the 
dress codes, or something, we’re more casual. We think it’s OK to be late, that’s what 
we’re like on the coast”; Tomislav S (♂ 13¼) added that dialects, cultures and dress 
codes were different from what he called “the people who are continental”. The 
continental part of Croatia, Jasenko B (♂ 12¼) said (the others agreed) began after 
Karlovac (a town on the road to Zagreb). Beyond this, Zrinka claimed, the people 
from the country were technologically less sophisticated, raising animals and inward 
looking – while “we’re from the sea, we’re kind of more outgoing, more familiar with 
technology. I don’t know if you can say we’re better educated”. Paerrgaard (1997, in 
Wiborg 2004) has made a distinction between “rational/negative” and “nostalgic” 
conceptions of rural spaces where the former is characterized by “an image of the 
village as undeveloped with ignorant people far from modern society” and the latter as 
“the rural village as a picturesque setting unspoilt by modern society’s negative 
influence” (Wiborg 2004: 427). Zrinka’s response illustrates the former.  
The use of “we” as opposed to “they” in the above quotes illustrates well 
students’ perceptions of regional differences and their own positive understanding of 
themselves in terms of these differences. Whereas people on the coast are constructed 
as “casual”, “mobile”, “outgoing”, “technologically savvy”, inland people are 
implicitly or explicitly positioned as formal, static, with those from villages being 
“less familiar with technology” and “less educated”.  
 The discourse of regional divisions was also evident in a group in a Zagreb 
grammar school. Roko L (♂ 14¾) spoke of the Slavonians (in the east of Croatia, 
towards the border with Serbia) as poor agriculturalists beset by droughts (there had 
been a particularly serious drought over the summer before this discussion, with 
agricultural production in Slavonia and other areas of the Balkans reduced by over 
50%): “when the conditions are not satisfactory, they have more concrete problems – 
they can’t feed their children, and that’s the issue for them …”.  Radoš B (♂ 14¾) 
sympathised: “… for them it’s more important to love your family than to love your 
country, because the country is not a concrete thing – it’s more abstract than your 
family”. This provoked a debate. Karlo C (♂ 15) disagreed that the Slavonians might 
feel less love for their country: “because the parts of Croatia that were most affected 
by the war – like Slavonia, Lika – they saw the horror, they saw dead people, they 
saw their enemies, they saw their families being killed. But in the parts of the country 
that the war didn’t affect – cities like Pula, Varaždin – they are much more developed, 
and … they weren’t on the battleground. The areas that were most destroyed are the 
areas where the people like the country the most.” Zvjezdana C (♀ 14¾) said: “I agree 
with Karlo. Someone from Vukovar loves Croatia a little bit more – they know what 
happened there - we all know what happened there, but they witnessed it – but I think 
                                                 
3 All names are pseudonyms: these are not always the same pseudonyms that were used for the same 
data in Ross (2015), because the dataset for the full 2000-person study has been revised to prevent the 
duplication of pseudonymous names.  
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we should learn a little bit more in school about that war.” In these quotes war 
becomes interwoven with (under)development and patriotism4.  
 What the above excerpts illustrate is students’ strong regional identification 
grounded in stereotypes about other regions. It can be noted that these stereotypes are 
not unambiguous in themselves, and that students’ understandings of regional 
identities refer to various forms of social differentiation. The Rijeka students talked 
about even more precise differences, between those people who live less than five 
kilometres from Rijeka. Danijela F (♀ 15¾) lived in Grobnik, 5 km away: “people 
there are not open-minded … they see Rijeka as something bad, and themselves as 
superior”. Agata (♀ 17¾ ) lived in one of a trio of small villages 8 km to the south: 
“we can’t stand each other – Hreljin, Krasica and Bakar. There’s only a kilometre 
between us – we say ‘Oh, from Bakar – we won’t talk about them’. [But] We are 
together when it’s Rijeka, when it’s Rijeka against Zagreb”. Students’ narratives 
suggest attachment to their local communities, which is permeated by inter- and intra- 
regional prejudice and divisions. But there are other narratives, equally strong, of both 
national cultural identities and of liminal European-Balkan identities. 
In terms of national identity, in Zadar there was reference to the Homeland 
War being a reason to feel proud of one’s country. Thus Adrijana M (♀ 15½) said “a 
lot of people died in the war, and we should be proud that we are Croatian. And I 
think the people who say they are ashamed to be Croatian are very bad, they shouldn’t 
say that, because a lot of people died there, and sacrificed themselves for this country, 
so that someday people could live here and have a normal life – I think that we 
absolutely have to be proud of who we are and that we come from here. We must be 
proud”.  Zadar had been in a war zone: Rijeka had not. Zorka V (♀ 16½) from Rijeka 
made this point: “about the war, Croatia-Serbia. I think that the people in schools 
today are all so proud of that war, like they were there and were fighting for their 
country – but it wasn’t actually them.”  She went on to criticize nationalism: “I don’t 
think being born on this particular piece of land gives me any advantages over anyone 
who wasn’t … I’m completely against nationalism. A lot of people from Rijeka and 
Croatia are very proud of their country – more than they should be. We in the Balkans 
… have some of the more nationalistically-orientated people in the world, and this is 
not always a good thing, because this leads to hate and intolerance.”  
This was echoed in the Zagreb gymnasium. Radoš B (♂ 14¾) said that Serbs, 
Bosnian-Herzegovinians and Croatians were “all very similar”, and it was not sensible 
to dwell on differences. He went on to say he was Croatian simply because his 
language was Croatian: “it’s not a big deal – it’s nothing”. But Vanda P (♀ 15) 
disagreed: “when you accept the culture of the country you are in, then you are from 
that country. We are Croatians because we act like Croatians, we speak Croatian – we 
do things that are … normal for Croatian people, and that’s what makes us Croatians.” 
Similar to earlier references to students’ regional identities, these excerpts suggest 
national identity formation as a process touching upon different forms of social 
differentiation with war experience as one central demarcation line. Consistent with 
these relational viewpoints on identity formation are the expressed understandings of 
national identity, which includes both relativistic and essentialist perspectives. While 
students (Adrijana, Vanda) from Zadar and Osijek (two cities that were directly 
                                                 
4 How to teach about the Homeland War has been a controversial issue in Croatia. According to Marić 
(2016: 106)), teaching plans and programs for history in Croatia promote ‘an ethnically biased , closed 
and militarily focused narrative’, although since 2009 certain authors of approved history textbooks 
have ‘managed to include perspectives that are neglected or even silenced in the dominant narrative of 
the war’.  
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affected by the war), expressed a sense of national belonging that is culturally defined 
and exclusive, students (Zorka, Radoš) from Rijeka and Zagreb (cities that were 
removed from the war front line), leaned towards a more universalistic outlook 
compatible with Bruter’s (2005) civic aspects of national identity. Together with the 
aforementioned layers of regionality and locality, these various forms of national 
identification express intersecting levels of exclusion and inclusion. 
 
4.2. Exclusion and inclusion within the Balkans 
 
“Us” and “them” divisions went beyond past war experiences and included sports as a 
playing field for acting out regional and international rivalries. The following excerpt 
by Agata N (♀ 17¾) from Rijeka illustrates such tensions:  
“I think we are all proud of [Croatia] – but again, we are not friendly towards 
Serbians or Slovenians – we hate Slovenians – but again, we don’t like each 
other in Croatia – I think it’s like we are in Croatia, but we are separated in a 
lot of ways – we don’t like people from Zagreb, because they are Purgeri, or 
people from Split or Dalmatia we call Tovari [laughter from others]5. Well we 
do! We can’t stand each other, and we can’t stand other people. I don’t know 
how we can live like this!  And I think mostly it’s because of sport. It started 
with Dinamo-Rijeka6 – we can’t stand them, they can’t stand us – I don’t 
know”.  
Discussions of Serbs provided interesting examples of inclusion and othering. There 
was clearly some animosity from some individuals, often centring, as mentioned 
earlier, on sporting contests. In Rijeka, Sanja L (♀ 11¾)  related tales of the January 
2012 handball game between Croatia and Serbia in Beograd: the Serbian fans, she 
said, pointed laser beams at the Croatian players’ eyes, and Želimir Ž  (♂ 13) and 
Sanja L (♀ 11¾) talked of coin throwing and the breaking of car windows: “The hate 
shows in the sports games”. Svjetlana M (♀ 13¾) went on; “those were only young 
people – they hadn’t really experienced war, they’d just heard stories and I feel that 
they didn’t have the right to do that”. More generally, Josip P (♂ 15½) in Zadar said 
he ‘didn’t have problems with Serbs in general, but I don’t like their war criminals”. 
There were also some remarks dismissing Cajke, the turbo-folk music from Serbia. 
Asked about potential Serbian membership of the European Union, the 
discussion swayed between some mild gloating that Croatia would be a member 
country some years before Serbia, and an acceptance that they could and should 
become members. Petar M (♂ 14½) in Rijeka said “we’re a lot ahead of the Serbians! 
In the way that we’ve developed. Serbians need to do a lot of work to get to the point 
that we have had to”.  Agata N (♀ 17¾) saw Croatian membership as “a big deal. We 
are part of the European Union, and they are not.” Teo Z (♂ 16½) in Zagreb remarked 
“they attacked us – but they should join”; his friend Aiša V (♀ 15½) agreed, even 
though “there are still people who would be negative about them joining.” The above 
excerpts illustrate stereotypes in relation to Serbs and Serbia that evoke Todorova’s 
(2009) “balkanization’ narratives”. These stereotypes utilize examples of the Balkan 
imagery (unsportsmanlike behaviour, war criminals, turbo-folk music, socio-
                                                 
5 Purgeri (from German Bürger) are families with a tradition over several generations of living in 
Zagreb: it has a negative connotation. Tovari (donkeys) is a northern Croatian term for people from 
Dalmatia, and is currently often used with reference to football teams.  
6 NK (Nogometni klub-Football club) Dinamo, football club from the Croatian capital Zagreb, and NK 
Rijeka, football club from the town of Rijeka.  
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economic and cultural underdevelopment) and use them as an implicit  demarcation 
line between ‘us’ and ‘them’.    
 While there were some reservations, Radoš B (♂ 14¾) thought some people 
would see Serbian membership as an attempt to “boss them around, and that [they] 
will want to make a Greater Serbia”, but that ultimately it would not matter. Andrija P 
(♂ 15¼) said the war was twenty years ago – “we just have to let it go” and Blaženka 
M (♀ 15) said “kids from Serbia who are our age, they didn’t have anything to do 
with the war, and I think that they need to have the same opportunities as us, as we 
have.” But in Zadar, Luka M (♂ 14¾) instantly snapped back at the question: “No!  I 
don’t like Serbians. Because of the whole war thing that happened.” Probably more of 
the young people accepted the concept of Serbian membership - in the future - than 
were antagonistic, but because not everyone commented on the issue, one cannot be 
precise about this.  
 
4.3. Europeans or Balkanci? 
 
Civic identity and citizenship have been traditionally associated with a defined and 
exclusive area. This has become partially eroded through processes such as 
globalisation, large scale migration, and the development of dual citizenship. Citizens 
of Croatia are now also citizens of the European Union, and this gives them rights and 
privileges beyond those given by their country.  
The young people we talked to drew a distinction between membership in the 
European Union and being European. Joining the Union divided opinions: many were 
cautious, but much the same number were cautiously in favour, which supports Ilišin 
et al.’s (2013) findings. Many comments concerned the financial implications of 
membership. Borna V (Rijeka ♂ u/k) thought the point of joining was that the country 
would be financially supported by other countries, but he was concerned that “we 
might have to lend money to other countries.” Zrinka B (Rijeka ♀ 14¼) added that “if 
we go into Europe and we don’t need any money to be given to us, then we’ll have to 
give ... So if we get in, and some other country needs money, we will have to give – 
and as it is, we don’t have a lot of money – so, it’s tricky.”  Dalibor N (Zadar ♂ 16) 
expected little change – “and if they change they will change for the worse – 
economics, basically economics”. Zdenko Z (Zadar ♂ 14½) thought financial support 
was not enough – “look at Greece – Greece also got aid from the European Union, 
and still it’s in major problems”. 
There were some hopes that there would be positive changes – maybe “young 
people will have a better life and work, that everyone will have a place to work, that 
people won’t be without a home”, suggested Aleksandra M (Zadar ♀ 15¾), but in the 
short term she expected to see little impact. This view was fairly common. Petar M 
(Rijeka ♂ 14½) looked not just to more employment, but that “we will be more 
connected to the European Union countries that are more developed than us”: “they’ll 
help us have better lives”, said Želimir Ž (Rijeka ♂ 13). 
There were also expressions of fear. Aleksandra M pointed out “we are afraid 
to enter … because we’ve always been under someone’s rule. It’s only in the past 
twenty years that we’ve had our own state”. Aiša V (Zagreb ♀ 15½) feared Europeans 
would move to Croatia and take jobs and buy all the property. There were also 
concerns for the future of the European Union: Branko K (Zadar ♂ 16½) compared 
the European Union to Yugoslavia – “Maybe even worse!”, added Josip P (Zadar ♂ 
15½). 
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But the European Union was also seen by some as a democratic force. Morana 
B (♀ 14¾) in Zagreb thought joining the Union was an “opportunity to develop our 
democracy … we should take it. Democracy is something I associate with Europe and 
the European Union. It depends on us: we are the ones who have to say we will do it, 
who will stick together... Other people in Europe will see our qualities and they will 
understand us a lot better”. In response to this, Vanda P (Zagreb ♀ 15) felt “there’s 
one problem about it here - we don’t know who we are choosing, we are not educated 
about that aspect of government.” In the above excerpts being European was 
represented (both in a positive and negative sense) with regard to its civic component 
(Bruter, 2005) whereby a common European entity might enable (or not) economic 
prosperity and the preservation of democracy. Besides this instrumental representation 
of Europe, in an emotional sense, that relates to Bruter’s cultural component of 
identity, European identity stays incomplete and contradictory as shown below (cf. 
Waechter, 2015). 
 It is not possible to classify individual responses as being simply either 
positive or negative, toward identification with Croatia, the Balkans or Europe.  Most 
individuals constructed their identifications in a variety of ways, responding to the 
particular contextual contingencies of the conversation at that particular moment: was 
the lens through which the subject was being viewed one of comparison to other 
Balkan states, or to the imagined conditions of Western Europe?  Was it part of a 
discourse that focused on generational aspects of difference from what they thought 
were the views of their parents and grandparents, or part of a discussion about their 
perceptions of commonalities (or not) with Serbians?    
 The dominant discourse was mainly of a sense of difference from Europe. This 
difference was sometimes expressed as a sense of being left out of Europe: Zagreb 
might look like a European city, said Blaženka M (♀ 15), “but in today’s Europe, I 
don’t feel that we are part of it, because we are left out”. Andrija P (Zagreb ♂ 15¼) 
distinguished the political from the cultural: “I personally feel like a part of cultural 
Europe, but because of being left out, I don’t feel a part of political Europe.”  Such 
nuanced ambivalence seems to confirm Delanty and Rumford’s suggestion of the 
emergent salience of a European social and cultural space, as distinct from an 
institutional space (2005:4). 
The difference was also expressed as a difference in “ways of being”. “Even if 
we enter Europe”, said Dragan L (Zagreb ♂ 14¾) “we will never be on that level of 
European society, because here people are very different from other parts of Europe. 
We don’t accept differences, different attitudes - for example, when Gay Pride was in 
Zagreb, people came just to throw stones. People in the Balkans are less tolerant than 
in other parts of Europe”. Mladen D (Zadar ♂ 15) thought it would be good “to be 
united with Europe - but the Croatian people are not European – they won’t be united 
like other countries”. This was a common expression: Lorena P (Zadar ♀ 14½) 
thought it “a good idea to become a member - but it’s also not good because we’re not 
civilised enough”; we need to be more organised, said Ružica L (Zadar ♀ 14½). 
According to Josip P (Zadar ♂ 15½): “we are Balkan, because we are different from 
the rest of Europe. We don’t have similar behaviour ... They are more polite  - We’re 
quite impolite and loud – not all of us, but some of us.” But he also suggested that 
becoming European was to loose one’s Balkan identity: “They’re trying to 
Europeanise us by force – but I hope that they don’t succeed, because we should stay 
as we are. I don’t feel European at all – I just feel Croatian, a Dalmatian, a Balkan”. 
Josip constructs here three identities that he uses, in this context, to define himself as 
not European; while Lorena assembles two variants of Europe, one of which she 
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would like to identify with, the other which she  constructs as excluding Croatians 
because of their presumed behaviour.   
Another group, in the Zagreb vocational school, tried to locate where the 
“real” Europe was for them: they suggested Germany, Switzerland and France. 
Zagreb was just “a small town”, said Teo Z (♂ 16½), while Marija M (♀ 15¾) had 
been dreaming of Paris “since I was five – if people from Zagreb behaved like people 
from Paris, I think we would be  … better! Maybe it’s my imagination – but maybe 
they are more sophisticated than people from Zagreb”. Ljubomir B’s (Zagreb ♂ 16) 
explanation was “because we are Balkanci’. Marija agreed: “People from the Balkans 
have a different culture and other people notice that”. “The behaviour is different”, 
said Ljubomir. Teo thought Croatia was “even worse Balkan than it was … new 
generations are worse and worse.” 
These excerpts illustrate a self-deprecating portrayal of intolerant, uncivilised, 
disorganised, impolite, unsophisticated and loud Croatian-Balkan people versus a 
tolerant, civilised, organised, sophisticated and polite Europe represented by countries 
of Western Europe: Germany, Switzerland and France. In this sense young people in 
Croatia see themselves in line with the dominant Western imagery of the Balkans 
(Todorova, 2009). However, not all students shared this self-deprecation. There were 
conflicting perceptions of Croatia’s position on the “developed (European)-under-
developed (Balkan)” continuum. In Zagreb, Vanda P (♀15) argued Croatia was not 
Balkan: “there are some effects from other countries - we are middle European, like 
Austria - even from the Ottoman wars, Turkey - also Hungary - Italy too - so we are a 
mixture of everything, but we are unique in our own way.” In Zadar there were 
expressions of being Balkan: Josip P (♂ 15½) exclaims “I feel like a Balkan!”, but 
Biserka K (♀ 14¾) said she did not: “I think our country is more polite than other 
Balkan countries, and people are better”. 
There was a sense that the designation “Balkan” was imposed from outside. 
The stigmatisation of the Balkans that Todorova (2009) suggests is echoed by many 
of these young people.  Želimir  Ž  (Rijeka ♂13) said: “European people always group 
us in that culture, with Serbia, but we are not like that”. In Rijeka Vida B (♀ 16½) 
said “they rank us as Balkans, the other people in Europe, and we have to live with 
that. It’s a label, we live with this label.  We try to distinguish that we are better than 
other Balkan people – and we say ‘Yes, we are going to be part of the European 
Union – we are more European than you other Balkan people’ - it’s a bad thing to be 
called, Balkan people.” Danijela F (Rijeka ♀ 15¾) agreed: “They gave this label to 
us, so we kind of accept it, and are partly proud of it – and now we’re going to be in 
Europe, and we don’t like other Balkans, because we think we are better than that.” In 
Zagreb, Dubravka S (♀ 15) talked of feeling that “Other people, from the Western 
countries think you’re primitive. Because we’re from this part of Europe. We are kind 
of left out [of Europe] - the superstitions [prejudices] of other countries, the Western 
countries, still don’t make you feel welcome there.” Andrija P (Zagreb ♂ 15¼) most 
clearly expressed a common perception: “no one wants to be part of the Balkans – for 
Croatians, the Balkans begin in Bosnia; in Bosnia the Balkans begin in Serbia; and in 
Serbia they begin in Romania – because of the prejudices of the Western countries.” It 
was almost as if each person described themselves as standing on a line: if they faced 
north-west, they saw Europe, and to the south-east were the Balkans. Each saw 
themselves as standing on the threshold. Todorova (2009) has described this as 
“nesting balkanisms”, a tendency for each area to construct the cultures to the south-
east as less civilised and more conservative. The gradient of nesting balkanisms 
(Elchinova, 2004; Todorova, 2009) was evident: in Primorje Petar M (Rijeka ♂14½) 
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saw Slovenia as “more of a European country than the [other] ex-Yugo countries - 
they are more developed than us … they moved on.” In Zadar, Josip P (♂15½) 
explained that “Slovenians used to be Balkans, but now they’ve become 
Europeanised, they’ve become part of Europe.” His colleague Mladen D (♂15) 
nuanced this: the Slovenians “are Balkans, but they are much more European, more 
European than we are … they behave like Europeans - they are calm, they are polite.” 
The dynamic nature of “Europe” and “the Balkans” is even more salient when 
the two are regarded as identity constructions. As such, they are still opposed to each 
other, for the Balkans are not alien to Europe, they are its “darker side” or incomplete 
self (Elchinova, 2004: 37).   
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Researching youth identities as we did has its limitations. Although 
discussions among peers can provide insights unique to focus groups as a research 
method, probing personal opinions in more depth is restricted. For instance, students 
in our study often drew on stereotypical representations of “others” and since 
stereotypes refer to generalizations of traits that are observed in some members of a 
group to all members of the group, regardless of actual variation among members 
(Koren, 2013), they tend to simplify complex issues. Unpicking this centrality of 
stereotyping in our study would therefore benefit from additional interviews with our 
focus group participants. Another limitation may be related to the overall theoretical 
framework of the study which guided data collection in several European countries. 
Due to this international study design more complex national specificities may have 
been overlooked, though we have tried to address this by reference to local authors 
where applicable. 
The young people from our study stand at the threshold between traditionally 
structured place identifications and a new way of political and cultural expression 
related to European Union membership. Croatian identity is cultural, predominantly, 
but is also political for these young people – not so much in terms of the political 
institutions, but in the political character of the independent state, established in the 
Homeland War. Bruter’s civic and cultural components of identity were both evident 
in their constructions of the country. Regional identities were also strong, and these 
seemed to echo the historical fragmentation of the country – such as the way in which 
the coastal groups distinguished themselves from the “continentals”. These country 
and regional identities were multiple and fluid: as the lens of the discussion moved 
from their perceptions of their city to the country as a whole, so different place 
identifications were foregrounded.  
The geographical borders of the various place identifications we explored 
operate as points of symbolic separation and articulation at which ethnic and other 
forms of stereotypes are created (Bennington, 1990, in Šakaja, 2001). The nature of 
being Balkanci was articulated by most of these young people as essentialist, a reality 
that could not be compatible with Europeanness. Todorova’s nesting balkanism has 
echoes of Said’s (1978) orientalism. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden (1992: 4) use the term 
“nested orientalism” to describe the hierarchical construct of the Eastern. There was a 
common sense of the Balkan-European divide being a line that stood very slightly to 
the north-west of wherever we happened to be talking: there was Europe, generally 
beckoning – but Croatia was portrayed as on a threshold though still leaning towards 
the Balkan side: underdeveloped, with littered streets and quarrelsome people. These 
young people were aware, in a way, of the transitional nature, the liminality of their 
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situation, but consistently described themselves as not yet having moved over the 
threshold. Although they appeared to recognise that they, and their generation, cross 
the boundaries of constructed categories, they also showed a sense of being not-quite-
yet European. Croatia’s “Europeanness” seemed more pronounced only in relation to 
Croatia’s eastern borders, mainly Serbia, which was then positioned as the “true” 
Balkan. Such perception of the Serbs “as more Balkan” - apart from more recent war 
experiences - echoes historical representations of Croatian identity as metaphysically 
inclined towards the West that simultaneously projected the Balkans “as the darkest 
side of human civilization in this part of the world” (Katunarić, 1997: 14). Although 
these representations can be related to historical developments that followed the 
Ottoman invasion of the Balkan Peninsula (Katunarić, 1997), they may still be 
reflected in modes of cultural stereotyping in relation to Croatia’s eastern neighbours 
(Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro) and other Balkan countries 
(Katunarić, 2007; Koren, 2013). 
Europe was, as an entity on its own, seen primarily as political – it was over 
there, offering financial mutual support, travel opportunities and education. Europe 
was for some of these young people a problematic construct. It was in some senses a 
desirable attainment, but as yet not achieved, and at the same time had an 
exclusiveness that meant that they felt as outsiders. Europe was thus seen only partly 
as cultural - something that they “ought” to share, but of which there was some 
uncertainty, and also to do with something described as “behaviour”, which seemed to 
encompass activities from financial probity to being conscious not to litter the streets, 
where it was felt that they fell short. But Europe was seen also and more prominently 
as institutional, and here there was a greater sense of focus and of anticipation. In 
terms of Bruter’s perspectives, Europe was more firmly constructed as a civic entity, 
rather than a cultural one, whereas the Balkans appear as more of a cultural entity. In 
an emotional sense, Europe remained distant, cut off partly by the attitude of “other” 
Europeans to them, partly by their distrust of their own “mentality”. Research findings 
from other European countries suggest that emotional distance towards Europe may 
be a more universal phenomenon (Bruter, 2005). As such it may explain why among 
young people in Europe “European identity is least important compared to 
identification with their location or their nation of residence or origin (Jamieson 2005; 
Macháček 2004; Spannring, Waechter, and Datler 2005; Waechter and Samoilova 
2012, according to Waechter, 2015: 2)”. Importantly though, and going back to our 
interest in intersectionality as an analytical strategy which rejects the separability of 
identity categories, we found that regionality, country affiliation as well as various 
senses of being on a European-Balkan spectrum co-existed in shaping complex place 
identifications.  
This study thus suggests that many Croatian young people may be developing 
complex and kaleidoscopic constructions of themselves as having a variety of social 
and political identities - within regions of Croatia, Croatia itself, Croatia within the 
Balkans, and Europe. There are very few empirical studies of a qualitative nature on 
the nature of civic identities (Joppke 2010:30), while those of Europeanisation are 
either of “institutional approacvhes that are mostly directed at the European Union 
[or] … studies of national societies in the context of EU-led processes” (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005:7). There is a plethora of quantitative studies (such as the 
Eurobarometer series of opinion studies), but these ask simplistic and context-free 
questions that can only be responded to within a predetermined and limited 
framework of essentialised categories.  This study contributes to a wider analysis of 
the processes of identity construction that acknowledges the multiplicity of identities 
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that people adopt, the contingency of their construction in terms of place, time, 
context and situation, and the plasticity of their responses.  These Croatian findings in 
some respects fit within a wider European framework of globalisation and 
localisation, in other respects are similar to findings in other countries in the same 
geographical region of Europe (Macedonia, Bulgaria, parts of Romania and of 
Slovenia), and in other ways are specific to Croatia (Ross 2015; forthcoming).   
In a study on young adults’ orientation to citizenship and European identity 
Grundy and Jamieson (2007) opposed a small group who “come to present themselves 
as passionate utopian Europeans”, to a majority of 18 to 24 year olds from their study 
for whom “being European remains emotionally insignificant and devoid of imagined 
community or steps towards global citizenship” (Grundy and Jamieson, 2007: 663). 
Those who did not feel a strong European identity ranged from those who were mildly 
positive or agnostic about the European Union to the ones who actively distanced 
themselves from the EU (2007, 670): they were “absent-minded”, in the sense of not 
having any sense of “being European” in their everyday thoughts. Our findings 
suggest that very few of the young people we talked to could be characterised as 
“absent-minded” about any of their multiple, intersecting place identifications. The 
Grundy and Jamieson (2007) findings, of a passionate – absent-minded spectrum of 
attitudes towards Europe was less polarised in the views of the young people we 
spoke to: they were nearly all interested and engaged in discussing their many senses 
of belonging. In this interchange of perspectives, narratives of modernization and 
“Europeanness” did not exclude those of the “Balkan-mentality” or the nation as a 
primordial given. Rather, it was evident that these opposed components coexist in the 
identity constructions of the young people in our study. Although from a democratic 
standpoint it is not clear if such a finding represents a cause for optimism or 
pessimism (cf. Katunarić, 1994), it certainly provides a dynamic element for future 
social relations in Croatia. 
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